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If a human being loses his political status, he should,
according
to
the
implications
of
the
inborn
and
inalienable rights of man, come under exactly the
situation for which the declarations of such general
rights provided. Actually the opposite is the case. It
seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the
very qualities which make it possible for other people to
treat him as a fellow-man.
Hannah Arendt (1966, 300)
Regional integration promised to open up borders, expand the
mobility
of
persons
and
resources,
institutionalize
multilateral cooperation fostering security and prosperity,
and multiply arenas of belonging, encouraging more inclusive
collective identities. In the North American case that promise
has rung increasingly hollow. Unequal relationships between
states were built into regional agreements and the priority of
national interests, especially security, often confounds
cooperation leading to harsh attempts to re-solidify borders.
In consequence, large groups remain excluded, are becoming
progressively marginalized, or find themselves caught in a web
of tensions created by the confrontation between transnational
forces and reassertions of local or national sovereignty.
Extricating such groups before they fall through the gaps is
proving
to
be
extremely
difficult
for
national
and
transnational institutions. This is exacerbated by the
exclusionary policies actively pursued by some national and
subnational governments in their efforts to resist the
incursions on their sovereignty brought by deterritorialization and global restructuring.
A growing literature has highlighted the institutional
failures that contribute to such exclusions and continue to
obstruct regional cooperation and its inclusive ideals of free
movement across boundaries and equal access to resources and
rights (see Ayres and MacDonald 2006; Studer and Wise (eds.)
2007; Gabriel and MacDonald 2007; Genna and Mayer-Foulkes
(eds.) 2011; Kapling and Nossal 2009; Van Nijnatten 2007;
Luccisano 2007). The conceptual confusions underpinning many
of those failures are not a strong focus in the literature,
however, particularly from the perspective of political
philosophy. This is, in part, because the deep connections
between the concepts of state, nation, citizen, human rights,
and sovereignty make it challenging to discuss one in any
depth without implicating all. It is nevertheless a challenge

Emma R. Norman
worth accepting if an appropriate starting point can be found.
In this respect, Hannah Arendt’s critique of human rights and
the notion of superfluousness emerging from it are invaluable
for the additional light they shed on the exclusionary
dimensions of immigration laws in North America. I argue that
the clash between globalizing forces on one hand, and a
reassertion of state sovereignty on the other, provides the
conditions for systematic exclusions from the protections that
human rights should deliver. In doing so, I consider some of
the ways the paradox of rights Arendt theorized in the 1960s
continues to beleaguer human rights today.
I first outline the conceptual confusions Arendt identified at
the foundation of a deep rivalry between citizenship rights
and human rights, a rivalry that lies at the heart of debates
over the Arizona Immigration Law and similar legislation. I
then
sketch
Arendt’s
notion
of
superfluousness
before
suggesting that several elements of her account appear in new
and
alarming
form
in
recent
U.S.
immigration
policy.
Elsewhere, I have explored in detail Arendt’s theoretical
arguments on rights, superfluousness and the state as well as
its potential application to several issues in contemporary
politics (Norman 2009, 2011, 2012). To minimize covering the
same ground, the following synopsis isolates the main points
pertaining to immigration control issues.
The Paradox of Rights
In Arendt’s view, the whole idea of grounding rights in a
notion of humanity contains a paradox at its base that at
certain historical junctures—for her in the aftermath of WWI
and in totalitarian regimes, but also now in times of
globalization—can
make
upholding
human
rights
extremely
challenging even when the political will to do so is very
strong. To function as a protective safety net against
government mistreatment or negligence, the Rights of Man were
designed in a way that tied them to humanity: to people, not
governments or states. It was thought that only this could
render them truly “inalienable”: irreducible to other rights
and laws. “It is by no means certain,” she argued, “whether
this is possible” since the functioning of any rights system
is predicated on the legal system, which requires the state
system (Arendt 1966, 298). A catch-22 ensues: human rights are
supposed to activate when the state fails in its duties to
some or all of its people(s), but they simultaneously require
the state system to be guaranteed and claimed. Human rights
therefore do not undercut the sovereign state. They are
altogether reliant on it. In consequence, although other
states or international organizations can intervene on behalf
of those whose human rights have been violated, the success of
2
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humanitarian intervention—and the system of human rights
itself—has to contend with the continuing fact of state
sovereignty (298).
For Arendt, the people affected most negatively by the paradox
of rights were those made stateless almost overnight when the
boundaries of Europe were redrawn after World War I. In the
face
of
millions
of
refugees,
the
legal
process
of
naturalization broke down internationally. Arendt’s worry was
that being stateless does not just deprive a person of
belonging to a territory. It deprives them of occupying a
clear “niche in the framework of the general law” (Arendt
1966, 283, citing Jermings 1939) the basis of which rests not
on human rights, but on citizenship status and the political
rights that accompany it. A fundamental conceptual confusion
between homme and citoyen thus permeated the 1789 Declaration
at its inception (Agamben 1998, 126), and was replicated in a
similar confusion over the relation between the individual and
the state in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR). Article 15’s lack of a clear definition of the right
to citizenship and its relation to the right to nationality
(Harrington 2009) clouds the conceptual picture further. It
might make intuitive sense to consider the biological status
and needs of humans as more fundamental than other statuses
and
privileges,
including
political
ones.
Yet
if
the
protection of these needs is expressed in the form of rights,
it is predicated on the prior existence of a functional legal
and political artifice, not the other way around. Logically
speaking, then, the exclusive concept of the citizen precedes
and is necessary for articulating the inclusive concept of
‘the human.’ And, contrary to the reverse derivation in
Enlightenment social contract theories, the state precedes and
is necessary for conceiving—and protecting—‘the individual.’
Arendt’s work on totalitarianism stresses the grave practical
consequences involved in placing human rights prior to
political rights and the ensuing problems with conflating
citizenship, nationality and humanity or basing conflicting
conceptions of rights on any or all of these. In becoming
stateless, she argued, persons are deprived of the only entity
that could guarantee a set of minimum rights (Arendt 1966,
291-2), rendering them vulnerable to abuse, since they have no
functional legal status in their own countries or abroad. The
state has the last word on who has legal status to be
protected,
and
whose
rights
will
be
suspended
or
deprioritized.
Unable
to
send
refugees
back
to
their
nonexistent homelands and unwilling to assimilate them into
their own sovereign nations, after WWI the idea of internment
camps for large groups of ‘the unwanted’ became (and in many
3

Emma R. Norman
places still is1) the “routine solution” along with a
temptation to resort to excessive policing and arbitrary rule
(287-8).
Human Superfluousness
Arendt’s concept of human superfluousness is rooted in the
inherent confusions of the paradox of rights and is a notion
that remains highly pertinent today, though new contexts are
generating it in diverse ways. The predicament of the
stateless “is not that they are not equal before the law, but
that no law exists for them” (Arendt 1966, 295-6). The absence
of occupying a defined niche in the legal system means that
the stateless are deprived of the most fundamental right of
all: “the right to have rights” (296). Without it, human
rights cease to function and the stateless are all but
condemned to fall through a glaring crack in the legal system
to the point where they are rendered superfluous—and treated
accordingly. This may sound like a radical claim based on an
equally radical and highly specific set of historical
examples, yet its implications are profound and hold much
contemporary significance when reflecting on the exclusionary
features of recent immigration policy trends.
The stateless have no state to guarantee their human rights or
to make claims against those who might violate them. They are
consequently
deprived
of
many
basic
things
legally,
politically and often socially: a place in the legal
framework, a place in the world to belong to and call home, a
state to claim human rights on their behalf, even their
individuality and specific group identity is in danger of
becoming blurred. They consequently vanish from our familiar
juridico-socio-political map, slipping through the fissures
between institutions, anomalies that no longer fit the ethicolegal-political framework the state system provides. If such
groups cannot be assimilated, Arendt claimed, it is easier to
view them as undeserving of the same kind of political
attention and status that citizens enjoy, or even see them as
threatening. The very existence of anomalous groups challenges
the legal-political framework which, in Arendt’s time, was
already destabilized by the effects of WWI on the territories
of Europe and sovereign authority of the defeated nations. In
the interwar period, European states responded by soundly re1

Administrative detention of refugees and asylum seekers is widespread in
Europe and the U.S. in restrictive detention centers and frequently in
prisons. For example, from 2001-2008 the Australian government shipped
asylum seekers to offshore camps on Nauru and Manus Islands, Papua New
Guinea. Both were shut in 2008, but the Christmas Island detention center
remains to deal with Australia’s policy of mandatory detention for
unauthorized aliens.
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exerting their authority over the stateless. In a context
where globalization is producing a concomitant challenge to
the solidity and permanence of territorial boundaries and thus
to state sovereignty, it is not difficult to see the Arizona
Immigration Law or recent nationalist rhetoric in Europe (see
Friedman 2010; Kuenssberg 2011) as clear responses to
precisely the perceived ‘threat’ Arendt highlighted.
On Arendt’s account, when groups are not claimed by a
sovereign authority able or willing to enforce the protection
of their rights, this can escalate to the point where they
“are treated as if they no longer existed, as if what happened
to them were no longer of any interest to anybody, as if they
were already dead” (Arendt 1966, 445). And so she claims there
was a certain logic to the progression from interment camps
for stateless people in the interwar period to “perfect” or
complete superfluousness (295-6). Arendt was referring to the
dehumanization tactics that produced the ‘living dead’ of the
Nazi annihilation camps where once-human individuals were
turned
into
unremembered,
replaceable
nonpersons,
indistinguishable from each other, and stripped of any
solidarity. This unclaimed, unwanted, “superfluous human
materiel”
(443)
was
condemned
to
be
shunted
between
authorities from one place to another, and ultimately
liquidated
if
conditions
were
thought
to
require
it.
Nevertheless, the pertinence of many of her claims is not
restricted to such extreme cases, or to the experiences of
statelessness
as
these
are
traditionally
understood—
particularly in an increasingly deterritorialized world.
State Sovereignty, Superfluousness and Immigration in North
America
The deterritorialization that accompanies globalization is
impacting the ways the paradox of human rights can lead to
contemporary variants of superfluousness that apply to more
than those who have no state to return to. In North America
since NAFTA, several reactions to the increased mobility of
persons and resources (and violence and contraband) across
porous borders and the decreasing control the three states
have been able to exert over their denizens and territory
reflect a desire to both resist deep integration at the
politicaland
regional-identity
level
and
reassert
a
traditional view of state sovereignty more consonant with the
idea of territorialized, nationally based citizenship rights
than it is with human rights. This is evident in recent U.S.
and Canadian reassertions of authority concerning their right—
recognized in international law—to determine who should be
granted citizen status with the legal protection that goes
with it and who should not. “It is in this respect that
5
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immigration has become central to the exercise of state
sovereignty” (Gabriel and MacDonald 2007, 271) It has also
become a site that is primed for the systematic generation of
superfluousness that is proving difficult to counter at the
institutional level for the very reasons Arendt identified.
The range and flexibility of labor, mobility and attendant
expanded citizen rights built into European integration at its
base was, and is, simply not present in the North American
model. Inclusion is far from equal across the three states.
For example, NAFTA’s Chapter 16 permits temporary free
mobility and labor rights across the region to a narrow group
of skilled workers, traders or investors. There is no cap on
the number of Canadians who can enter the U.S. under this
visa. “For Mexicans, a limit was set at 5,500 initial
approvals per year for a transition period of ten years (until
2004)” (Trade Compliance Center 2012).
Two further examples of the clampdown on mobility rights and
privileges in the region brace the legal inequality. In the
U.S., the June 2009 Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative made
it mandatory for U.S. citizens (re-)entering the U.S. by land
or sea to present a passport, passport card, Enhanced Driving
License or Trusted Traveler Card. This has greatly affected
many Mexican-Americans wishing to visit their families in
Mexico,
deposit
remittances
there
or
engage
in
other
socioeconomic transactions. Canada followed suit a month
later, backpedalling on its originally lenient immigration
laws in response to a reported almost threefold rise in
Mexican refugee claims since 2005. Immigration Minister Jason
Kenney announced that, “In addition to creating significant
delays and spiraling new costs in our refugee program, the
sheer volume of these claims is undermining our ability to
help people fleeing real persecution” (Citizenship and
Immigration Canada 2009). A Temporary Residence visa is now
required for all Mexicans entering the country.
The temporary visa effectively tightened the 2004 Canada-U.S.
Safe Third Country Agreement controls on those attempting to
claim refugee status at the Canadian border, essentially
closing it to the vast majority of Mexican refugee claimants
if they had already passed through a “safe” country (the U.S.)
in which they could claim asylum from persecution, or a wellfounded fear of it, at home. This agreement’s institutional
expression of shared bilateral responsibility over what to do
about the influx of immigrants and refugees, and where to
shunt them next, is only superficially promising, for the
question of—and protection of—state sovereignty overshadows
that of human rights here. It is manifestly problematic for
Mexican refugee applicants to both countries. Their home state
6
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might be willing to to receive them, but it is in many cases
unable to fully ‘claim’ them by guaranteeing their human
rights
in
the
face
of
overwhelming
narcoviolence
and
institutionalized corruption. Tougher Canadian border controls
have also contributed to the heightened perception of ‘threat’
that ‘the unwanted’ are generating in the United States. If no
country in the region is prepared to fully claim the
‘unwanted,’ certain forms of superfluousness ensue despite the
best efforts of nonstate human rights actors.
The current reassertion of state sovereignty has focused on
stiffening control through the abundance of proposals and
funding for more policing of North American borders (see
Gunkel and González Wahl 2012). In the U.S., former anti-drug
and immigration-crossing measures have been adapted to the
drives of the war on terror, cementing the now-pervasive
connection between immigration policy and security concerns.
This is most symbolically expressed in the blatant effort to
re-solidify territorial borders quite literally via the U.S.Mexico border wall, 649 miles of which had been constructed in
August 2011 (U.S. GAO 2011, 38). The combination of attempts
by the undocumented to avoid falling foul of drug gang
presence on one side, or greatly augmented patrols and new
technologies on the other, seriously heightens the risk of
death in the most inhospitable parts of the desert or in the
sea around the coastal border area. The cumulative effect has
been less of a deterrent to illegal crossing than it has been
to actively force the use of the most perilous of routes. The
connection of the basic objective of this policy to the logic
of superfluousness is clear: one way or another, far fewer
illegal immigrants should enter. Regarding the many shocking
tales of deaths involved in crossing the Mexican-U.S.
frontier, one remark from a retired U.S. Border Patrol sector
chief is revealing of how superfluousness is generated today.
“The strategy is a failure. All it’s accomplished is killing
people… But since these people are Mexicans, no one seems to
care” (Gunkel and González Wahl 2012, 39, citing Moser 2003).
The trails to the remaining gaps in the wall also channel the
surviving undocumented migrants into certain areas en masse.
The 2010 Arizona Immigration Law (SB1070) and related
legislation in other U.S. states have complemented this with a
reassertion of the authoritative value of citizenship rights
over the illegal immigrant community, coupled with giving
heightened powers to state police—one symptom that Arendt
correlated with the production of superfluousness in interwar
Europe. “Theoretically,” she wrote, “in the sphere of
international law, it had always been true that sovereignty is
nowhere
more
absolute
than
in
matters
of
emigration,
naturalization, nationality and expulsion” (Arendt 1966, 278).
7
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This led her to muse on such “weapon[s] of denaturalization”
(279), again emphasizing the strong contemporary connection
between security and immigration issues.
Illegal immigrants are not stateless in the sense Arendt
discussed. They generally belong to an existing state to which
they can be deported and, in the case of the 11 million
Mexican illegal immigrants the recent U.S. laws have targeted,
that state does not prohibit their return. However, the
difficulties the Mexican government is experiencing in its
ability and willingness to guarantee the observation of their
human rights at home is not offering substantial incentives
for the deported to remain in Mexico, or for those
contemplating emigration because their basic needs are not
being met. In the absence of such incentives, deterrents
abroad are escalating in response. Recent U.S. legislative
reactions to illegal immigration exemplify the ongoing rivalry
between citizenship and human rights while also reflecting new
forms of superfluousness that, despite their lower-grade
character, remain insidious.
It is well known that SB1070, which criminalizes being in the
state without applying for and carrying valid documentation,
has perturbing implications for human rights by increasing the
likelihood of arbitrary arrest and detention and promoting
discrimination on the basis of racial appearance. It is in
danger of contravening Article 9 of the UDHR concerning
arbitrary
arrest,
detention
and
exile
and
also
could
transgress international law’s stipulation that detention is
“‘a measure of last resort’... deemed appropriate only when
states
can
demonstrate
that
it
is
‘necessary
and
proportionate’ to the objective being achieved” (Gunkel and
González Wahl 2012, 40). It likewise risks not just blurring
the distinction between civil and criminal law, but dispensing
with it (39). The human rights of the most vulnerable—notably
asylum seekers, human trafficking victims and women—are hit
the hardest. Such cases also flag the institutional failures
that spring from such control measures in the conflict between
U.S. state immigration legislation and the prior responses
that human rights institutions have established to protect the
most susceptible.
SB1070 is unclear on what documents constitute valid proof of
lawful presence in pending petitions for asylum. The broad
latitude and lack of instructions to enforcement officials
could result in the “unjustified detention of individuals who
have initiated the process to legalize their status in the
U.S… [which] contravenes Article 31 of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, as modified by the 1967
Protocol” (Mayer et al. 2010, 31). A similar lack of clarity
8
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applies
to
escaped
victims
of
human
trafficking.
“By
criminalizing the failure to produce this proof, the Act
punishes the victims instead of the traffickers” while
jeopardizing the effectiveness of the T and U visa programs
the federal government offers to protect trafficking victims
(31). Women are also less likely to report crimes to police
(notably violent crimes and domestic abuse) if this would
require them to produce documentation or lead to possible
detention,
criminal
prosecution
and
deportation.
This
conflicts with the waiver furnished by the prior federal
Immigration and Nationality Act intended to protect victims of
domestic violence who enter the country illegally (31).
The conflict here between state interests, federal law
provisions and international legal obligations is patent. So
too is the conflict between citizenship rights and human
rights, especially when prioritizing the former is used
(bio)politically as an expression of state sovereignty
(Agamben 1998). Such institutional failures don’t necessarily
imply the existence of a total legal void. Federal and
international provisions are there. Illegal immigrants are not
the ‘forgotten’ stateless, for whom there exists no juridical
niche whatsoever. But undocumented persons are still ‘the
unwanted,’
‘the
outlawed,’
and
in
many
respects
‘the
unclaimed.’ In Arizona and Alabama, federal and international
laws created for their protection in precisely these cases are
trumped by state laws created against them, making it more
difficult for human rights institutions to extricate them from
their position caught in the middle.
Part of the reason lies in the low level of cooperation
between (and within) the North American states in resolving
migration issues in the region which obstructs institutional
success in “claiming” immigrants or rights on their behalf.
The contrast with how European states reinforce regional
accountability and conflicting national and regional policies
is striking. When France expelled over 1,000 Roma in August
2010, for example, the instant widespread outcry led to the
September 9th European Parliament Resolution calling for the
immediate suspension of all deportations of the Roma. The
European Commission launched infringement proceedings, setting
a two-week deadline for the French government to cease
violations of the 2004 European Directive on Freedom of
Movement and the regional ban on ethnic discrimination in the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights. France complied.2
2

But only after claiming that the expulsions were based on questions of
national security, not ethnicity (see Mayer et al. 2010, 36), paralleling
similar defenses in the February 7, 2012 Arizona brief to the Supreme Court
(see Winograd 2012).
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Recalling the opening quotation from Arendt, in this case at
least, the regional government, the publics of member states
and human rights organizations cooperated to “claim” the Roma
as “fellow” Europeans—if not Arendt’s “fellow men”—and their
rights in a way that is proving far more difficult for
institutions on the other side of the Atlantic.
The absence of a regional political identity and status in
North America certainly indicates that it is harder to treat
undocumented migrants as “fellow men” and women, and easier to
treat them as superfluous nonpersons excluded from human
solidarity. The policy of self-deportation, or attritionthrough-enforcement, that has occupied recent debates in the
run-up to the U.S. presidential election reinforces this. The
strategy deliberately aims to render everyday life so wretched
for unauthorized immigrants that they choose to go home
regardless of how immersed they are in the community, as well
as being a deterrent to those contemplating unlawful entry.
Intentionally creating not just discomfort but misery lies at
the base of the new Alabama law, which has already stimulated
much fear and fleeing.
Unauthorized parents took their kids out of school, they
refuse to seek medical services, fear going to church,
they don’t drive anywhere, their access to water service
has been threatened. Some employers have refused to pay
their workers, judges and court interpreters threatened to
report suspected unauthorized immigrants. (Waslin 2012)
This policy of making life unbearable for illegal aliens is
being packaged as a “kinder, gentler alternative to the harsh,
expensive, and unworkable strategy of mass deportation”
(Waslin
2012).
An
Arendtian
reading
belies
this.
The
undocumented are seen as undeserving not merely of the same
kind of political attention citizens enjoy, but of basic
social needs and human consideration. In Arizona deportations
have skyrocketed under Obama’s presidency (Winograd 2012) and
the projected increase of now-legal arrests and incarcerations
exhibits disturbing parallels with Arendt’s claim that “the
interment camp…has become the routine solution for the problem
of domicile of the ‘displaced persons’” (Arendt 1966, 279).
Administrative detainees are often jailed in the same spaces
as convicted criminals, are similarly attired and restrained,
and subject to the same risks of physical harm even though
international law stipulates they should be separated for this
reason (see Gunkel and González Wahl 2012, 40).
The fact that SB1070 has spurred cognate legislation in other
states reinforces the gravity of Arendt’s observation that, in
the absence of political rights, the effective power of human
10
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rights evaporates at the very moment they are needed the most.
In the European case, transnational citizenship status has
been employed as one way around this problem: regional
political rights can be used as partial anchors for human
rights and transnational solidarity if national political
rights are withheld. However, the contemporary consensus is
that too many differences exist between Europe and North
America in the conditions and objectives of integration to
contemplate the possibility of a shared regional citizenship
in the latter case any time soon. Even if it were possible in
the future, Arendt’s paradox of rights is still likely to
apply (see Norman 2012). If political status disappears,
“human” status and solidarity apparently disappear with it.
Bills proposed in the 2012 session in Missouri, Mississippi,
Tennessee and Virginia suggest this disappearance will
continue in North America, despite probable Supreme Court
blocks of some of their more extreme tenets.

Conclusion
Several elements of globalization have meant superfluousness
is no longer a condition restricted to the stateless, and
capitalized
on
by
totalitarian
regimes
in
death
camp
scenarios. It is one tactic that can be utilized by otherwise
democratic regimes in their attempts to reconcile the
sovereignty requirements of the modern state system with
globalized conditions of migration, economic and political
interdependence, conflicting regional, national and local
interests, international legal obligations and sanctions, and
technological advances. The point to add here is that weak
regional
cooperation,
self-interested
unilateral
or
subnational problem solving, and radically unequal national
status
provide
many
conditions
for
the
systematic
proliferation of new forms of superfluousness. The forms being
generated today are, for the most part, less extreme than
those in Arendt’s arguments. Yet this does little to detract
from their insidious character or potential spread.
The quote from Arendt at the beginning of section one begs the
question: what can encourage us to “treat a (hu)man” like a
“fellow (hu)man”? This is one of the basic enquiries
underpinning the kind of multilateral cooperation and regional
integration that penetrates deeper than the mere optimization
of national economic interests on the world stage. The present
argument provides no positive answers. But it does indicate
that a satisfactory response is unlikely to be found in human
rights alone, however tenaciously they are fought for. Valuing
and institutionalizing a regional respect for their equal
application, and a political space to express it, is as
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crucial as providing functional institutional state and
nonstate human rights enforcement. Insofar as Arendt’s paradox
of rights remains unresolved and the reassertion of state
sovereignty continues in its present forms, it is doubtful
that nonstate actors will be fully successful in stretching
far enough across the fissures in the legal safety net that
the rivalry between human rights and citizen rights create—
fissures toward which so many illegal immigrants are now being
deliberately herded.
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